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Premiering on the 50th anniversary of the Cuban Missle Crisis, this film focuses on three central figures in the crisis -- President John F. Kennedy, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev and Cuban leader Fidel Castro.
Source: Kanopy
This book completely transforms our understanding of the actual roles that each of the principal EXCOMM members played in the decision making process that led to a peaceful resolution of the Cuban missile crisis.
This volume introduces and provides a brief overview of major factors that contributed to the Cuban missile crisis during October 1962. Personal narratives are also shared, allowing readers first-hand details that other books on this topic do not supply. Readers hear from a Soviet Naval Officer as he goes to battle, and a British Journalist who recalls the tense weeks of the crisis. Two native Cubans also share their memories.
For thirteen days in October 1962, America stood at the brink of nuclear war. Nikita Khrushchev's decision to place nuclear missiles in Cuba and John F. Kennedy's defiant response introduced the possibility of unprecedented cataclysm. The immediate threat of destruction entered America's classrooms and its living rooms. Awaiting Armageddon provides the first in-depth look at this crisis as it roiled outside of government offices, where ordinary Americans realized their government was unprepared to protect either itself or its citizens from the dangers of nuclear war. During the seven days between Kennedy's announcement of a naval blockade and Khrushchev's decision to withdraw Soviet nuclear missiles from Cuba, U.S. citizens absorbed the nightmare scenario unfolding on their television sets. An estimated ten million Americans fled their homes; millions more prepared shelters at home, clearing the shelves of supermarkets and gun stores. Alice George captures the irrationality of the moment as Americans coped with dread and resignation, humor and pathos, terror and ignorance. In her examination of the public response to the missile crisis, the author reveals cracks in the veneer of American confidence in the early years of the space age and demonstrates how the fears generated by Cold War culture blinded many Americans to the dangers of nuclear war until it was almost too late.
The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited is a comprehensive overview of the great cornucopia of new materials recently released by the Soviet Union, United States, and Cuba. The authors, some of whom were participants in the crisis, have all had a major role in bringing to light either significant reevaluations of the crisis, or in some cases, truly startling revelations of the extant wisdom surrounding much of the crisis. The collection, edited by a long-time student of the crisis, is a coherent, original, and up-to-date work that bears on a moment when the world, for good cause, held its breath in fear that the morning might bring the apocalypse.
The Soviet response to the first edition of Reflections has been a prime example of the new openness under glasnost in discussing previously taboo subjects. Using new revelations--such as the fact that Moscow had twice as many troops in Cuba as the Kennedy administration believed--from key Soviet and Cuban Sources, Garthoff has revised his earlier analysis to produce the most accurate, eye-opening story yet of the 1963 crisis. In this book Raymond L. Garthoff, a participant in the crisis deliberations of the U.S. government, reflects on the nature of the crisis, it's consequences, and it's lessons for the future. He provides a unique combination of memoir, historical analysis, and political interpretations. He gives particular attention to the aftermath and "afterlife" of the crisis and to its bearing on current and future policy. In the first edition of the book in 1987 the Garthoff presented a number of facts for the first time. Since then, more information has become available, particularly form Soviet sources, in part from conferences in which Garthoff participated but even more from individual interviews and research. This new information, much of it presented here in this volume for the first time, helps to fill in gaps in our knowledge about events and motivations on the Soviet side. More importantly, it enlarges our understanding of the crisis interaction.