The Inch’ŏn LandingEarly histories of the Korean War characterize the Inch’ŏn landing as a strategic masterstroke, asserting that it ended the Communist threat to overrun the Pusan Perimeter (Spanier 1959, Leckie 1962, Fehrenbach 1963). As Rutherford M. Poats succinctly states, it “turned near defeat into brilliant victory and assured [MacArthur] a permanent rank of greatness” (Poats 1954: 56). Later writers would fault his decision to appoint U.S. Army Lieutenant General Edward M. Almond, his chief of staff, to command X Corps because the main element in this attack force would be the U.S. 1st Marine Division. In his study of X Corps, Shelby L. Stanton (1989) stresses the personal dislike between Almond, who he admires, and Major General Oliver P. Smith, the U.S. Marine commander. Nevertheless, most historians continued to venerate the clairvoyant MacArthur for his achievement of a military miracle (Middleton 1965, O'Ballance 1969). But in the 1980s, writers began to question the assumption that Inch'on was a great gamble. The North Koreans, they would argue, already were beaten...